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For years, the Bank of China and its sister banks served a
confined sector of the Hong Kong community, and their participation
in the retail banking industry, as well as in trade and industry
financing, was limited.
China's open door policy and the economic readjustment
programme activated a series of reformations in her enterprises.
Starting in 1978, the Bank of China Group, consisting of thirteen
sister banks in Hong Kong and one bank in Macau, has aggressively
sought a larger market share. In a few years time, it has become
the second largest banking group in Hong Kong, second only to the
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank.
This research report focuses on how this recent aggressive
business strategy is reflected in the different aspects of the BCG's
business. On the liability and equity side of the balance sheet,
the BCG banks have injected additional capital, put out new
instruments, such as the U.S. dollar deposit, negotiable
certificates of deposit, and short-term deposits with various
maturities. The increase in deposit-absorption power of the BCG
banks is matched by a corresponding enlargement and diversification
of their assets. A number of financial subsidiaries, as well as
joint ventures with foreign financial institutions, have been set up
by the BCG banks to enhance investment in loan syndications, the
real estate and property market and a wide variety of short to lou
term loans.
On the grounds that trade and industry financing is the main
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source of income for the BCG, a substantial portion of this report
is devoted to describing strategies of the BCG in such financing.
Some criteria for evaluating the creditability of the loan
applicants and the lending policy of the BCG in small industrial
loans are described in detail. A real case business loan
application experience is included to illustrate what problems the
potential clients of the BCG may face in applying for loans.
Other functional aspects of the BCG in personnel training and
information systems are discussed. The report ends with the
writers' concluding comments and the future outlook of the business
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Launching a series of promotional programmes in November 1983,
the Bank of China and its subsidiary banks have increased their
spending heavily on advertisements to promote their new products.
The All branch checking account service was advertised through the
major media. The Bank of China Card is the product they are
selling while this report is being written. Their aggressive
marketing strategies make known to the people of Hong Kong that they
are emerging as a strong second power in the banking industry
hitherto dominated by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. A new era of
competition has come.
Despite the long history of the PRC banks, it was not until
1978 that they adopted an aggressive marketing policy in the Hots,
Kong market. With the advent of China's open door policy in late
1978, economic performance became a much more important criterion in
evaluating the success of an enterprise. Authority was delegated
down the bureacratic structure. The autonomy of each enterprise was
greater than ever before. In April 1979 the Bank of China was
upgraded and put under the direct leadership of the State Council,
whereby the Bank of China became the foreign exchange bank of China.
Thereafter, the Bank of China was more ready to cope with the needs
of the new economic age and initiated a series of changes, not only
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in itself but also in all its subsidiary sister banks.
Many of the changes were strategic and revolutionary and took
place in China. The strengthening of senior management teams,
injection of new capital, investment portfolio in foreign exchange,
Eurobonds and syndicated loans attracted the attention of
international financial institutions. In Hong Kong, the changes
took the form of moving from the passive role of accepting
business and deposits of China-related organizations to actively
sharpening their deposit-taking instruments, thus aiming at a more
profitable and diversified portfolio.
The first noticeable move was the computerisation of retail
banking services in 1980. The thirteen sister banks (hereafter
referred to as the Bank of China Group, or the BCG) were linked up
by a computer network and appeared to the public as a single entity
with widely dispersed outlets. This program provided the necessary
prerequisites for direct competition in savings deposits with the
leaders of the market. Though the BCG seems to be a single entity
from the public's viewpoint, each bank within the BCG is an
investment centre, being held accountable for profits and
investments. In fact, the previous segmentation of the market, with
each bank sharing a certain portion, was waived. Now each bank can
make its own investment decisions. During the five years of rapid
expansion, the number of branches and sub-branches of the Bank of
China Group has almost doubled, standing at over 250 by the
beginning of March, 1984.
The major business of the Bank of China Group is that of a
commercial bank, though loan syndication and international financing
3are a possibility for the future. Besides, deposit taking and
loans, the Bank of-China Group operates in the areas of foreign
currency deposits, foreign exchange, gold exchange, remittances to
China, documentary credits, investment consultancy and insurance.
Objectives of the Study
On the grounds that credit loans to medium-to-small size
enterprises are the major contributors to the profits of the BCG,
this study is primarily intended to look into the adequacy of the
loan and credit policies, which provide the framework for the
aggressive business strategies of the BCG. Through extensive
research,* the writers have obtained valuable information to fulfil
the following objectives in this research:
1) To discover the origins of the momentous 1978-84 strategic
changes of the BCG.
2) To realize the actual developments of the BCG in areas of
investments, portfolio and liabilities.
3) To investigate the forms of commercial credit and loans,
the usual terms and the usual requirements placed
on the customers.
4) To understand how the BCG officers conduct the normal
business in the commercial loans and credit.
5) To describe how background functions such as training,
personnel, and information systems support the aggressive
strategy.
6) To talk with the senior officials of the BCG and understand
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their style and business insights, which are important to
future development.
7) To comment on the adequacy of present policies (including
loan policy) and on the future outlook of the BCG.
5CHAPTER TWO
METHODOLOGY





REAL CASE BUSINESS LOAN APPLICATION EXPERIENCE
These methods were designed in such a way so as to supplement
each other in providing an overall picture about the policies of the
BCG. And, most important of all, data collected from the one source
served to back up that from each other source, so that the
conclusions reached at the end of our investigation are much closer
to the actual situation. Both the telephone investigation and the
real case business loan application experience were deliberately
designed to get first-hand information about the BCG lending policy.
Library Research
Besides the research work that was carried on in the librirv of
the Chinese University, the. information center of Hong Kong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation and the U.S. Government Printing Office
of have been approached for general background information. Much
valuable information has also been collected from the information
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department of Wen Wei Daily.
Personal Interviews
The main emphasis of our study has been placed on personal
interviews. People that have been interviewed can be divided into fotir
categories.
Present or Past Officer of the BCG
One past BCG credit officer, who was working at the operation
level, was
interviewed. And four other officers, in charge of different depa rtnio nt
of sister banks, were interviewed also. They included:
1. An Assistant General Manager, in charge of the marketing activi t ie
of Sin Hua Trust, Savings Comm°rcial Bank.
2. A Manager, in charge of the personnel department of
the Bank of China (BOC).
3. A Deputy General Manager, in charge of training and development
4. A senior of ficer, who preferred not to disclose his identity,
acted as
a spokesman for the Hong Kong and Macau Office during a telepho ie
interview.
Bankers from other banks
These include an officer from Hong Kong Shanghai Banking
Corporation, a banker from Bank of America and a past senior officer
of Citibank.
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Persons who have dealt directly with the BCG
A person, in charge of an Import-export firm and who had a History
in dealing with the BCG, was interviewed.
Academicians
Lecturers of the Chinese University, who were involved in
training program for the senior officers of sister banks in the
summer 1983, were also interviewed.
The writers wish to evaluate the BCG business policy fran four
different points of view so as to generate a better understanding
about its policy. Three out of the four viewpoints are given by
outsiders.
Telephone Investigation
In this inve s tiga teion, a letter giving a rough description of
a company's financial situation and asking for a loan was sent to
each sister bank. At the end of the letter, the writers asked the
credit officer who read the letter to give a call to the company.
The promptness and, if necessary, the repetitiveness of these phone
responses, as well as the seniority of the officer who responded,
are good indicators of each sister bank's enthusiasm for followit
up loan initiation. The second objective of this study was to ask
the officers of each sister bank the different loan application
requirements.
8Real Case Business Loan Application Experience
One of the writers was very fortunate in being able to
represent an import-export firm to apply in person for a loan from
the sister banks. In the application process, the writer had a
direct contact with the credit officers of several sister banks.
This experience gave the writer an invaluable opportunity to
understand how the customers are treated and the process involved in
applying for a loan with the BCG.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE CHANGE OF THE BUSINESS POLICY OF THE BCG
In the past, the BCG was not willing to disclose any of its
information to the outside world. The writers found that it is
still very difficult to collect information concerning the BCG. Even
those who have long been dealing with them said that not much was
known about the BCG. This chapter is intended to give the readers a
general idea about the BCG's objective, the development of its
business policy and its performance in 1982.
Objective
In the 1981 annual report of the Bank of China, Mr. Bu Ming,
who is the chairman of the Bank of China (BOC), said that the
fundamental mission of BOC is to contribute to the socialist
construction of the PRC.
In July 1983, Mr. Zhao Ziyang, the Prime Minister who is the
head of the State Council, to which the BOC is responsible, said
that the objective of BOC is to operate actively in the foreign
market to attract foreign capital to aid the modernisation programs.
Contributing to this objective, the BOC is to arrange for
foreign capital, which is mainly used for the construction of key
projects, the production of export commodities and the exploitation
of natural resources. The BOC also utilises this foreign capital to
support the introduction of advanced technology and the import of
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equipment into China as well as the expansion of the PRC export
trade. This is done through joint venture, cooperative production,
compensation trade, processing and assembling. And the main emphasis
is put on the development of the economic zones, which are just in
the vicinity of Hong Kong.
The BOC branch in Hong Kong, the largest of its overseas
offices, controls the activities of other banks in the region
affiliated with it or incorporated in the PRC, the so-called sister
banks. The Hong Kong branch also contributes the largest portion of
the BOC's profits. The BOC and its sister banks offer the same
services as other Hong Kong financial institutions. Although they
operate much like other private banking institutions in Hong Kong,
competing for deposits, lending and borrowing funds, and
facilitating international trade, they definitely follow the
objectives set in Beijing, one of which is the promotion of Hong
Kong's economic prosperity and stability. Pursuing this objective,
the BCG bought the open-air car park beside Garden Road to build its
new headquarter, invested in establishing the second largest retail
banking network and introduced the small industrial loan to aid the
local manufacturer, just to name a few of its projects.
In short, the objectives of the BCG in Hong Kong are to
1. absorb foreign capital,
2. facilitate the introduction of advanced technology
to the PRC,
3. facilitate the import of equipment to the PRC,
4. facilitate the expansion of the PRC export trade,
5. promote Hong Kong's economic prosperity and stability.
11
Development of the ECG( 1975- 1981)
Brief Historical Developmen
The China-incorporated sister banks have a long history that
dates back to the previous Chinese government. The Bank of China wa
set up in 1912 and the China State Bank in 1927. At that time, only
the Bank of China and the Bank of. Communications, together with two
other banks, which no longer exist, were run by the government. Thy
rest of the China-incorporated sister banks were privately-owned.
After the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the
Bank of China was reestablished as a joint state-private enterprise
with nominal private shareholders and subordinate to the People's
Bank of China, for whom the BOC acted as an agent in handling
foreign exchange in the international settlements. The rest of the
China-incorporated banks were progressively taken over by the PRC
government, but their external branches in Hong Kong were left with
separate identities. Now, the sister banks operate in concert with
the local BOC branch.
Recent Development
In the October 1983 issue of Asian Banking, the sister banks
were described as cultivating an image of stolid conservatism in the
past. Before 1978, the BCG set it face against anything that snacked
of capitalist speculation. They stuck firmly to the most
conservative types of banking activity. The bulk of their customers
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were Chinese state organisations, pro-Beijing businesses and
cultural groups, and firms and individuals dependent on China trade.
The price of such respectability was a severe cutbacks in the
local market in the face of mounting competition from the rest of
the banking industry. From 1975 to 1977, there was a contraction in
the sister bank's market share (Table 1). In 1978, the BCG began to
fight back, and by 1979, they were showing rapid growth. The
expansion of its business has been associated with the moving away
from its previous state of conservatism and isolationism. A speech
delivered by a senior officer of Sin Hua Trust, Savings and
Commercial Bank promised, The BCG will make as many friends the
outside world as possible and will try to improve its internal
management system.
The rapid growth of BCG business is shown clearly in the data
that the writers collected from different sources. For tables one to
four, the 1975 to 1979 data were collected from the research
department of Hang Seng Bank. The data for the years 1980 to 1981
were found in the October 1983 issue of Asian Banking. It must be
noted that those figures in table 1 to 4 represent the combined
performance of all sister banks in Hong Kong, except the Bank of
China. Because these data did not include the performance of the
Bank of China, one can more accurately evaluate the BCG performance
in Hong Kong. Since, unlike the Bank of China, other sister banks
have their major share of business in Hong Kong. For detailed
breakdown, please refer to Appendix IV to VII.
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Table 1
DEPOSIT OF THE BCG EXCLUDING THE BOC
(HK$ MILLION)
Bank 1975 1976 1977 1978
Sister banks 12,227 13,408 15,840 21,169
Total all banks 36,343 44,030 53, 019 59, 929
Sister banks'
33.6 30.5 29.9 35.3share of total(%)
Bank 1979 1980 1981
Sister banks 29,917 40,722 52,873
67,985 88,490 109,227Total all banks
Sister banks'
44.0 46.0 48.4share of total(%)
Figures are from Hong Kong 1982, Appendix 1
The writers found that from 1975 to 1977, there was a
contraction in the sister banks' market share. And the growth rate
of deposit was below the overall industry figure. But, from 1978




LOANS OF THE BCG EXCLUDING THE BOC
(HK$ MILLION)
1975Bank 1976 1977 1978
8,506 10,8139, 212Sister banks 14, 502
24, 9 98 29,480 46, 42836, 856Total all banks
Sister banks'
34.0 31.2 29.3 31.2share of total
1979Bank 19 80 19 81
22,420 33P507 43, 696-Sister banks
62,227 94,970? 128) 2 04,ETotal all banks
Sister banks'
36.0 35.3 34. 1share of total 0/0)
IP Figures are from Hong Kong 1982, Appendix 12
In 1976 and 1977, the amount the sister banks loaned out rose
at a rate of 8.3 and 17.4-,percent, respectively, lower than the
industry average of 17.9 and 25 percent. The sister banks came into
an actual growth lead in 1978 and 1979. So, for the five years
ending 1979, the sister banks expanded their lending by an annual
average of 40.9 percent compared with 37.2 percent for banks
overall.
In terms of being lent-up, Hong Kong has seen a radical shif t
in the last decade. The sister banks have been part of the change
but more cautiously. The trend is shown in table 3. In 1975, the
ratio of loans to deposits (L/D) for all banks in Hong Kong was 68.8
percent, while the figure for the sister banks was 69.6 percent..
From 1976 to 1978, the sister banks had actually reduced the L/D
ratio. -But, by the end of 1979, it had risen to 73.7 percent.
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Although this figure was below the Hong Kong average, the sister
banks' readiness to expand their loan portfolio on this scale was a
break with the highly conservative lending policies typical of
earlier years. And hesitation among the sister banks' executives
about unreserved involvement in local lending seemed to disappear
from 1979 onward.
Table 3
LOAN TO DEPOSIT RATIO OF THE BCG EXCLUDING THE BOC
(PERCENT)
1975 1976Bank 1977 1978
69.6 68.7 68.3 68.5Sister banks
6'68.8Industrial Average 0 9 77
19 79 1980Bank 19 81
74.9 82.3Sister banks 82.6
Industrial Average 91.5
The figure for the industrial. average in 1980 and 1981 is
above one. It shows the boom of lending in these years.
The aggressiveness of the BCG in expanding its business is
shown not only shown in the increase in its L/D ratio but also in
manifesting the growth of its profit. The data in table 4 reveal
some peculiar trends in profits. In 1977 and 1978, net profits moved
up roughly in line with the expansion of total assets. From 1979
onwards, the sister banks' prof its shot up by a weighted average of
80 percent and totalled HK$ 551 million. Although profit growth
slowed down in 1980, it still sustained an annual 10 percent and 5
percent growth in 1981 and 1982, respectively.
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Table 4




26,23119,84117, 06515, 606Total assets
19 8219 811979 1980Bank
1, 1481, 088989551Sister banks
101,69373,95655, 30538%289Total assets
In table 5, the total number of branches maintained a low
annual growth rate, about 8 percent. But, starting from 1979, growth
rate went up to 19 percent in 197 and 15 percent in 1980. And the
average annual growth rate from 1981 to 1984 was about 14 percent.
Now, in 1984, the BCG has become the second largest retail banking
network in Hong Kong. For locations of the branches of the sister
banks, please refer to Figure one.
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FIGI: LCCATLON MAP FOR THE BRANCHS AND SUB-BRAN'HES OF THE BCG


















NUMBER OF BRANCHES AND SUB-BRANCHES
OF THE BCG IN HONG KONG
'75 '76 '77 '78 '79 '81 '84Bank
Bank of China 2 4 6 7 9 10 13
Bank of Communications 14 14 15 16 17 21 27
Sin Hua Trust, Savings
& Commercial Bank 14 15 17 18 22 25 37
Kincheng Banking Corp. 8 9 9 10 12 13 20
Kwantung Provincial Bank 12 12 12 12 13 14 17
National Commercial Bank 5 6 6 7 9 11 13
Yien Yieh Commercial Bank 8 9 9 9 11 12 18
China & South Sea Bank 10 10 10 11 11 13 15
China State Bank 8 9 9 9 10 11 19
Nanyang Commercial Bank 12 14 15 16 21 25 39
Po Sang Bank 1 1 1 1 3 4 3
Hua Chiao Commercial Bank 5 6 6 8 9 11 19
Chiyu Banking Corporation 4 4 4 6 6 11
The BCG 103 113 119 128 153 176 251
Hong Kong & Shanghai
Banking Corp. 274 296
Chartered Bank 99 113
Hang Seng Bank 55 91
4 of these 27 branches are mini-banks, which are located
in store departments specialised in selling China products,
27 of these 91 branches are located in MTR stations.
Traditionally, the backbone of the sister banks' deposit base
has been the accounts maintained by China related organisations,
which to Beijing or Guangdong province or which are involved in the
China trade. These included department stores, leftwing schools,
trade unions, newspapers and the dependants of all these
organisations.
With the increase in the number of its branches in Hong Kong,
the BCG no longer limits its deposit base to these organisations.
From the distribution of its branches, it is evident that the BCG is
now targeting the entire Hong Kong population as its customers.
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Besides the changes concerning its business policies,
substantial changes have been observed in other areas. In March
1979, the Bank of China was put under the direction of the State
Council. This move raised the importance of the Bank of China not
only for its increasing foreign exchange but also for the special
attention put on it by the central government. The BOC is now the
sole foreign exchange bank for the PRC. It carries on central bank
functions in relation to international settlements, shares control
of foreign exchange transactions with the State Council, and
executes needed international money transfers. Overseas, the BOC
offers the whole range of banking business: retail, commercial and
merchant banking aimed at the local market where the branches
operate. In mid-1980, after the second meeting of the fourth Bank of
China Conference, it was decided that a vice-chairman of the Bank of
China was to lead these banks. For the purpose of easier management,
the head offices of these China-incorporated banks were moved to
Beijing. And capital was injected into the rest of the
China-incorporated banks (Table 6). Even before mid-1980, there had
already been an increase of capital in all the sister banks. The
reason for the substantial increase in their capitalisation might
have been that the Hong Kong government planned to raise the minimum
capital requirements for local banks, although the
China-incorporated banks would have been exempted from this
requirement. Beijing apparently thought it was sensible to comply
with the requirement of its own accord. Another factor seemed to he
a general desire in China's financial establishment to switch over
to balance sheet practices that reflect commercial realities.
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Table 6
CAPITALISATION OF THE BCG
(HK$ MILLION)
Before '80 Sep. '80 '81Bank
Bank of China 1, 200 3, 000 3,000
Bank of Communications 300 1,200900
Sin Hua Trust, Savings
Commercial Bank 240 600 900
240Kincheng Banking Corp. 600 900
Kwantung Provincial Bank 240 600 900
450National Commercial Bank 150 750
150 450Yien Yieh Commercial Bank 750
450150China South Sea Bank 750
China State Bank 450150 750
100 200Nanyang Commercial Bank 200
Po Sang Bank 25 100 100
Hua Chiao Commercial Bank 30 50 50
Chiyu Banking Corp. 30 100 100
The Position of the BCG in 1982
Following the rapid expansion of the BCG since 1978, serious
doubt began to be voiced among the sister banks executives about the
wisdom of such enthusiasm by communists for capitalist clients. In
particular, the sister banks seemed to have been beguiled by the
dreams of easy affluence that had captured so many of Hong Kong's
real estate speculators. The aggressive lending policy that the BCG
adopted was presented in December issue 1980 of Asian Banking. That
information is summarized in table 7. The writers found that,
besides those of the Bank of Communications and the Bank of China,
the L/D ratio of all the sister banks exceeded the 75 percent, which
was set by the Hong Kong government. TheYien Yieh Commercial Bank
displayed an L/D ratio that approached 95 percent. According to the
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postulation made by 'an editorial of the Hong Kong Economic Journal
on January 5th 1984, the high L/D ratio in 1982 resulted from
political lending. Loans were easily granted to those businessmen
who had some relationship with a PRC government official. And when
the property boom was declining, the sister banks continued to lend
money aggressively to those property firms, in the hope of
maintaining the prosperity of Hong Kong.
Table 7
LOAN TO DEPOSIT RATIO OF THE BCG IN 1982
(PERCENT)
Bank Loan Deposit L/D ratio
Bank of China 25, 444 35, 314 72.05
Bank of Communications 1,220 1, 4 44 84.51
Sin Hua Trust, Savings
Commercial Bank 881 1,008 87.39
Kincheng Banking Corp. 763 855 89.23
Kwantung Provincial Bank 751 831 90.23
National Commercial Bank 517 554 93.25
Yien Yieh Commercial Bank 487 516 94.59
China South Sea Bank 515 574 89.60
China State Bank 530 563 94.21
Nanyang Commercial Bank 771 997 71.29
Po Sang Bank 219 251 87.10
Hua Chiao Commercial Bank Nil Nil Nil
Chiyu Banking Corp. 218 251 86.83
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The extent that the BBUU was involved in the property market can
be shown clearly in the following examples. When Tse Lee Yuen
Jewellery Limited went bankrupt, Nanyang Commercial was found to be
the largest creditor. It was owed HK$53 million secured on t he
jewellery company's premises. In the failure case of Eda
Investment, the sister banks were again found to be heavily
involved. The debt owed to the sister banks was over HK$ 950
million. The Bank of Communications had a share of HK$402 million
Sin Hua Bank, HK$302 million and Hua Chiao Bank, HK$206 million. The
sister banks were also found to be one of the creditors of the
bankrupt Carrian Corporation and the trouble-lay, .n Trafagar Housing.
The BCG was well known to have financed various state
enterprises of Guangdong province, which, in turn, speculated
heavily in the property market of Hong Kong. They also had exposure
to a large number of sound manufacturing firms in Hong Kong, who
found the line of real estate speculation irresistible. When the
real estate business collapsed in 1982, these same state enterprises
and manufacturers went into serious trouble. Being one of their
bankers, the BCG found itself facing many potentially sour debts.
Because published accounts did not reveal the impact of this
situation on the sister banks, it was difficult to measure the
extent to which net profits had been reduced. Hong Kong incorporated
banks tried to improve their liquidity in 1982 by slowing down their
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growth in lending in relation to the expansion of their
deposits.They also made provisions in their published accounts on a
more generous scale than the other sister banks felt necessary.
Regarding the source of funding for bad and doubtful debts, the
Bank of China staff said that the sister banks cannot be treated
a monolith. To a certain extent, the way that each sister bank
tackled the problem reflected its own resources and management
style.
Although the above aggressive policies that were adopted by the
BCG were questionable, the sister banks rank high in Hong Kong in
terms of both assets and profitability (Table 8).
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Table 8
RANKING OF SISTER BANKS IN 1982
In terms In terms Assets profit
of of Prof it- Bank (US$ million)
Assets abili ty
1 2 Hongkong & Shanghai 56,709 361.8
Banking Corporation
7 3 Overseas Trust Bank 26.51,602
8 5 Shanghai Commercial Bank 1,313
10 8 Far East Bank 1,306
14 19 Nanyang Commercial Bank 1,067 10.1
15 10 Wing Lung Bank 797 18.7
16 22 Bank of Credit & Commercial 746 5.5
17 24 Sun Hung Kai Bank 712
18 20 Ka Wah Bank 670
19 23 Hang Lung Bank 655
20 15 Liu Cheong ling Bank 621 11.7
21 25 Hong Kong Commercial Bank 480 4.7
22 16 Po Sang Bank 470 10.1
23 21 Kwong On Bank 451
24 16 Wing Hang Bank 438 10.1
25 17 Chekiang First Bank Ltd. 435 7.7
7.326 18 Daao Hang Bank 422
27 26 Hua Chino Commercial Bank 392 4.0
2 1 Bank of China 49,375 554.9
3 4 Bank of Communications 3,270
4 9 Sin Hua Trust, Savings & 1,826 19.2
Commercial Bank
5 6 Kwantung Provincial Bank 1,793 22.7
6 11 Kincheng Banking Corporation 1,682 18.1
9 12 China & South Sea Bank 1,309 15.6
11 7 Yien Yieh Commercial Bank 1,233 21.3
12 14 National Commercial Bank 1,209 13.7










THE BCG ORGANIZATION AND THE SISTER BANK RELATIONSHIPS
Unlike most commercial banks in the world, the state-owned Bank
of China Group serves both economic and political purposes. Before
1978, the clients of the BCG were mainly organizations related to
China trade, the Chinese product emporiums, the working class
schools, unions, China-related organizations and their employees and
dependents. The business was confined to a particular circle. The
Bank of China was a symbolic representation of the Beijing
goverment in Hong Kong.
With the advent of China's economic readjustment program, the
BCG was required to undergo reformations to ensure that it had the
right type of organization structure, well-qualified personneI,
adequate resources and the appropriate business strategies. Many of
the political roles that it might have played in the past are now
presumably shifted to the China News Agency. Today, the BCG, with
its over 250 bank branches and sub-branches and a dozen subsidiary
institutions, forms the second largest financial institution in Hone
Kong, second only to the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, and with




Due to the historical role of the BCG mentioned above, the
organization of the BCG at corporate levels has its unique features.
The reforms after 1978 have probably made it more effective than
before. Basically, the Bank of China Group is made up of thirteen
sister banks in Hong Kong and one bank (another is undergoing
acquisition) in Macau under the leadership of the Bank of China,
Hong Kong and Macau Regional Office, which reports to the head
office of the Bank of China in Beijing, which is, in turn, under the
leadership of the State Council. (Figure 2)
FIGURE 2
THE RELATIONSHIPS OF THE STATE, THE BANK OF CHINA
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As the Bank of 'China is a state-owned foreign exchange bank, it
is apparent that it is held directly responsible to the State
Council. The Bank of China has a number of branches overseas
including London, Luxemburg, New York and Singapore, wt-tile its
branches in Hong Kong and Macau are of utmost importance in the Asia
Pacific region. The Hong Kong and Macau Regional Office is locatcXd
in Hong Kong and directs all the branches and sub-branches of the
Bank of China Group, which consists of the following banks:-
1. The Bank of China
2. The Bank of Communications
3. The China South Sea Bank
4. The Kincheng Banking Corporation
5. The Kwantung Provincial Bank
' 5. Sin Hua Trust, Savings and Commercial Bank
7. Yien Yieh Commercial Bank Ltd
8. The National Commercial Bank Ltd
9. The China State Bank Ltd
10. Chiyu Banking Corp. Ltd*
11. Hua Chiao Commercial Bank Ltd*
12. Nanyang Commercial Bank Ltd*
13. Po Sang Bank Ltd*
14. Nantung Bank (Macau)
15. Tai Fung Bank (Macau)**
* Banks incorporated in Hong Kong.
** Acquired by the Bank of China in December 1983 and will be the
15th bank in the BCG
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The Hong Kong Macau Regional Office
The role of this office in the BCG organization is so
interesting and important that it deserves further elaboration.
Located in the Bank of China H.K. Branch Building, the IIKM Regional
Of fice(hereaf ter called HKMRO) is comprised of more than a hundred
staff. Its main function is to co-ordinate major business issues
among sister banks and to balance key strategies.
The HKMRO includes the Training and Development Department
responsible for staff training of the BCG, (to be discussed in
Chapter 7), a personnel department for setting out personnel policy,
a computer department in charge of the information system of the I3CG
and a social committee for recreation and welfare. The principal
line function of the HKMRO is, of course, the management of the BCC
banks. However, judging from research inferences, the writers
assert that the HKMRO is responsible for steering only at the
corporate level, and that its authority does not extend to the
business strategies and operations of the sister banks. The sister
banks are independent entities with full autonomy, but they act in
compliance with the goals of the whole organization.
Sister Bank Relationship
Before 1978, the relationships among sister banks could be
described as competition aversive. However, competition within
the bank group and with the other commercial banks is the name of
the game nowadays.
The lack of incentive to compete was something philosophical.
Firstly, competition was believed to be a waste of economic
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resources. A centralized planning and co-ordination system was
believed to be superior. This concept of business oranization
prevailed in China, as well as in its trade and business
organizations in Hong Kong, till 1978. A second reason for the
out-of-pace conservative position of the BCG may have been the lack
of expertise and insights needed to initiate significant turnarounds
in strategy.
The competition aversive strategy of the BCG cain be tracod
through a study on the location of bank sub-branches. The Kwintung
Provincial Bank located its sub-branches mainly along the
Kowloon-Canton Railway to take up business in theperthern purt of
the New Territories. The Sin Hua Bank had many of its bank of t ices
crowded in Kwai Chung and Tsuen Wan. (see Figure I) the
banking network was not computerized till 1980, sub-branch locations
became an important distribution strategy for providing sorvice to
local customers. Thus, market segmentation by region t%as one wav to
describe the system before 1978. In terms of business clients,
there was some form of division of labor among the membe: banks.
For example, the Sin Hua Bank was mainly involved in the torcelein
and yarn trade, while another sister bank had great concern in the
fishery business.
What then have been the changes in the years after 1975. As
mentioned, competition has now become a general prnct ice among the
BCG banks, and each member bank tries to establish its own market
position based on its own strengths. Such trends are visible on
analysing the spectrum of development of the BCG since, 1978.
The Nanyang Commercial Bank is the first among the ICG banks to
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market the Federal Card---- a credit card,- that has gained
increasing acceptance in major shops, restaurants and hotels in llong
Kong, Macau and mainland China in the past few years. This lend by
the Nanyang Commercial Bank is probably founded on its good
reputation and long years of relations with the local bustnessmen.
In trade finance, this locally incorporated bank is also famous tor
its rapid bill processing and aggressive attitudes towards small
business organizations, such as the numerous garment mai ni f :acturers
throughout Hong Kong. (More about the loan business will he
discussed in Chapter 6.)
The China State Bank became competitive by pioneering in thy'
issue of negotiable certificate of deposits (NCD). The 1'i en 1 i eh
Bank sought new business with a 12-year installment housing
mortgage scheme for property-users in 1982 when the real estate
industry was losing support from speculators. The Sin lilt:t Sank I s
specializing in financing import-export trade and has sp cial
interests in providing a buying-selling service to securities and
mortgage loans on securities. The China and South Sea Bank
identifies itself by acting for its clients in real property
purchasing and selling and also in providing rent collection
services. A well-known specialty service of the BCG is the gold and
silver dealings by the Po Sang Bank, which has now become one of L he
most profitable banks in the BCG.
So much has been said about the sister banks, what about the
Bank of China itself? With its position of being the 13th largest
bank in Asia and the 33rd largest in the world in terms of assets
(amounting to HK$390 billion), the Bank bf China is more .interest c\t
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and specialized in corporate and international banking, though it
still has to satisfy its local, small account customers. It has
participated in a number of syndicated loans and has shared the lean
portfolio with a number of the sister banks. Eurobond dealings and
foreign exchange market operations can be effectively handled onlv
through banks of its size. The other sister banks cannot expect to
compete with the Bank of China at present.
As described above, the present relationships among the bauk
of the BCG are competitive. But that description is not couplete
without mentioning, on the other hand, the co-operative nature ot
the relationship. The main form of co-operation is well presett(«1
in the all-branch savings and checking account services, JETCO k
joint Auto Teller Machine service), joint participation in
syndicated loans, and joint staff training, etc. Another form 11
co-ordination that so far, has• not been realized is financial bacl-up
by the Bank of China. The Bank of China has the authority to make
up any funding deficits faced by the sister banks. However,ckit,irtt
information does not indicate that any assistance has been reyu 1 t F.!
from the Bank of China so far. However, even if the Bank of Chteta
decided to strengthen the finances of a sister bank, the trans:i,•t ioti
would probably not pass through the published balance sheet but
would enter via a direct injection of funds as a balancing iteta t
offset the impact of substantial write-offs.
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CHAPTER V
A NEW BUSINESS STRATEGY
---DIVERSIFICATION IN ASSETS AND LIABILITY
The policy of managing investments and portfolio was made
explicit by a deputy general manager of the Bank of China when he
indicated that the scope of business and new investment will
continually be expanded and the way of operation will become ix i'e
flexible. Besides deposits, loans, remittances and documentary
credit, the BCG will commit itself more in the international hduk i:
business, for example, foreign currency deposits, certificates o:'
deposit, the gold business and syndicated loans.
The following discussion shows the change of the BCG business
strategies in two areas, new subsidiaries and loan portfolio, w i t h
special emphasis on real property mortgages and syndicated lo:ttns.
New Investments and the Changing Portfolio
Subsidiaries
Fulfilling the saying of the BCG officials that the BCG wilt
operate any business that is allowed in the Colony, the BCG
established a number of subsidiaries not only in joint ventures with
outsiders but also in a wide range of other business.
Subsidiaries were established as early as 1979. But, at ttl:it
time, most subsidiaries established have been primarily financt:il
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institutions. But in the past two years, newly-established
subsidiaries are engaged also in the insurance and leasing business
and in the purchase and sale of stocks (Table 9).
Table 9
NEW SUBSIDIARIES OF THE BCG
Other New
Date BCG Participating Subsidiaries
Companies Formed
1979 Hua Chiao NIL Chiao Yue Finance
Commercial Bank Co. Ltd.
1979 NILChiyu Banking Chiyu Finance Co.
Corpo ration Ltd.
April Bank of China China Insurance China
1979 Group Co. Ltd. Development
Finance Co.
(HK) Ltd.
April Bank of Chine The. First National CICC Finance




April Bank of China Bank of Tokyo Kincheng
1980 Ki n ch e ng Banking Tokyo Finance
Corporation Co. Ltd.
Dec. Far East BankBank of China Trilease
Societe Generale19 83 International Ltd.
Dec. Po Sang Bank Independent stock Chung Mao Securities




Table 9 is by no means complete, it was intended only to show
readers the kind of new investments the BCG has made.
The initial capital for establishing Chiyu Finance Co. Ltd. was
HK$50 million CICC Finance Ltd. HK$10 million Kincheng Tokyo
Finance Co. Ltd. HK$5 million Chung Mao Securities Co. Ltd. HK$5
million. The finance companies listed in table 9 engaged in the
business of taking deposits and lending, underwriting stocks, forex
trading, gold dealing and trading of commercial paper and
certificates of deposit. The Trilease International Co. Ltd. is
involved in the field of equipment leasing. And the Chung Mao
Securities Co. Ltd. is engaged in the purchase and sale of stocks
for sister banks' customers.
Loan Portfolio
In Chapter three, the writers pointed out that the FCC was
deeply involved in the trouble-laden companies. And, from the total
amount of the loan, of HK$1,003 million that the BCG extended to
only two of its customers, Tse Lee Yuen Jewellery Ltd. and Eda
Investment, the writers postulated that the BCG lent out a similarly
large proportion of its loan reserves to the property market of llonn
Kong. The writers could only estimate the actual amount because of
limited sources of information.
In achieving objectives 1, 2 and 3, which the writers mentioned
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in Chapter three, the BCG has been active in extending loans to
finance projects for basic construction in Kwangtung and Fu jiaang
provinces. From 1979 to 1980, loans for projects in these two
provinces amounted to HK$800 million and supported more than 200
projects. Most of these projects are in light-industry: textiles,
dyeing, construction and reconstruction of hotels and processing of
sea products. Loans were extended either directly to those
organisations from the two provinces or to Hong Kong or `laaciu
businessmen, who invested in these two provinces. Thus, most of t lac'
projects were accomplished through processing made to order,
assemblying made to order and compensation trade. And, from `he
statistics shown recently by the PRC, loans to finance pr o jt' c t s ill
the PRC will increase further in the future.
The BCG is also very active in financing off -shore oil projects
and the building of nuclear plants.
Syndicated Loans
The participation of the BCG in syndicated loans has been said
to cause much excitment in the international banking community. The
first syndicated loan in which the sister bank of the BCG (tile Bank
of China) participated was a US$ 42 million loan to Gloxi n, a
subsidiary of the Hong Kong-based Sun Hung Kai. This is a Ct' ipalnv
that enjoys a good relationship with the PRC. This syndicated load
was principally organised by Paribas Asia to fund the construct ion
of a US$ 55 million building. Participants included the Bank of
America, the Bank of Montreal, the Bank of Tokyo, Dresdner Bank, i l t
Kleirwort Benson (HK), shared an amount equal to that of the BBOC.
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Shortly of ter that, the BOC built up its reputation in this
field by becoming one of three co-lead managers with Chase Manhattan
of New York and Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation in a 11KS
55.7 million loan. The maturity period is ten years. This was the
first time that the BOC took a lead position in arranging such a
loan. The loan was extended to the China Cement Company (HK), which
is 20 percent owned by Kiu Yie, a Beijing-controlled cc ipanv.
The other syndicated loan in which the Bank of China
participated was a US$ 150 million loan. The money was lent to the
African Development Bank. The loan involved a large number of banks
throughout the world. In this case, the BOC arranged, by itself, a
portion amount to US$ 3.7 million to a newly formed Hong Kong
company involved in the building of a hotel (Fa Yuen Hotel) in
Kwangtung Province.
The BOC's principal lending is summarised in Appendix V.
Real Estate Mortgage
In the past, the BCG way of managing real estate mortgages has
been very conservative. The maturity period for housing loans
usually lasted for 12 years but seldom longer than 15 years.
Realising that this period had not been adequate in view of the
public's increased desire to buy homes, the BCG plans to extend the
maturity period from 10 years to 15 years.
The Yien Yieh Commercial Bank started in 1982 to offer loans
with special favourable terms to those who buy a flat in an
industrial or residential building for their own use. The mortgaev
can go as high as seventy percent of the cost of the flat. The
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maturity period is twelve years. During the first two years,
borrowers do not need to pay back any of the principal but only the
interest, which is at a rate similar to those of the Hang Sete Bank
and the Hong Kong Shanghai Barking Corporation. National
Commercial Bank offers similar real estate mortgage loans, but with
a maturity period of fifteen years. But, the interest rate is out,
half of one percent higher than that of the Hong Kong Shanhai
Banking Corporation.
New Financial Instruments
In the struggle for market position, the BCG has put out
number of new instruments to absorb deposits. Such instnmetns add
variety to the traditional time and demand deposits. Some of them
are new among the BCG and some are "firsts" in the entire Hon Kollg
banking industry. Table 10 gives a summary of the new istruments.
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TABLE 10
NEW BANKING INSTRUMENTS OF THE BCG
Instrument Maturity Interest Rate RemarksAmount
Negotiable Floating,3 months First lauchedHK$50, 000 up
Certificate 6 months by The Chinamarket rate
of Deposit 1 Year State Bank among
the sister banks
U. S. Dollar Floating rate Available atUS $100 up
Savings N.A. of internat'l every branch
Deposit money market
U.S.Dollar Fixed1 month, AviLable itUS$1,000 up
Time 2,3,6,12 everv branch
Deposit months
Renminbi 3 months Fixed, lower Available atRMB$100 up
Time than HKD6 months every branch,
Deposit deposit rate a utnique1,2,3 yrs
*iustrume
Short-term HK$500, 00024 hr call Negotiable, Became effective
Large 7 days call favorable on March l, 1983and up




VariousBits in Various Higher than A target saving
piece out savings rate instrument tor
Savings floating Customers





* Offered first in Hong Kong by the BCG
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. Most of the instruments became available after the
establishment of corresponding DTC's of the sister banks. This
greatly increased the deposit absorption power of the BCG. From thy'
customers' point of view, the BCG can now cater to their different
needs and is in the same attractive position as all the other local
and foreign banks. As for the BCG, the raising of deposit
absorption power was a prerequisite for competition, but the actual
utilization of the new instruments is its main concern. Wi th
enlarged liabilities, the BCG can fulf it its mission of providing
foreign exchange funds to China, on one hand, and, as was discussed
in the previous section, earning profits through its asset Porttolio
on the other.
The negotiable certificate of deposit (N. C.D.) was firs t
introduced by The China State Bank in 1982 through its subsidiary
deposit taking company. The instrument was intended to be a test
for the CD market and would be extended if it proved to be
successful. The RMB (Renminbi, currency unit of the PRO time
deposit was a relatively old instrument, originally designed to
avoid interest tax and exchange risk so as to give a better
guarantee (guaranteed by the Bank of China in Beijing) and a higher
investment return to the customers. However, with the high interest
rate and the weakening of the Hong Kong dollar in the 1980's and,
most important of all, with the BCG's changing philosophy towards
profitability and risk, the RMB time deposit was redesigned. It is
now just one form of foreign currency deposit (foreign relative to
the HKD) similar to the U.S. dollar deposit. The customers have to
bear the exchange rate risk in the buying and selling of Ri113.
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Morever, the low interest rate of RMB deposits relative to that of
HKD deposits discourages funds flow towards the RMB. 1t is trite
that the RMB deposit instrument is losing its importattc e, while us
dollar deposits are becoming more attractive due to the strong U.S.
dollar and the high U.S. interest rate. With the arnendment of
banking regulations, starting in March 1982, the BCG could offer
favourable interest rates to short-term deposits of amounts
exceeding half a million HK dollars. The maturities availahle for
this instrument vary from l day to 3 months less l day. Such an
instrument enables the BCG to gain a share in the large depositor
market. on the other hand, the BCG has been of ferie the" Bits in
piece out" deposit plan for years to help customers who do not have
much money to achieve their saving targets. While the short-term
large deposit instrument targets the upper end of the market, the
"Bits in piece out" aims at the other end. It can also be
postulated that the new instruments are a means to pellet rate the
wealthier sector and the institutional banking markets. In the past
few years, the Bank of China with its European branches was able to
gain a significant amount of Eurodollar deposits, enrichine its
sources of funds.
Brush-up of Old Instruments
Not only is it important to devise new instumetit but it is
also essential to upgrade and improve the existing tnstruments in
this direction, the BCG computerized its savings deposit operations
in 1980, making it the second largest saving deposits network after
the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. In December 1983, its time deposit
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services were automated by the introduction of the All branches and
sub-branches checking services, of which warned the major banks of
the BCG's intention to step actively into the commercial loan and
credit market.
The first automatic teller machine (ATM) was introduced in
early 1980 by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. (The system is called
ETC, Electronic Teller Card.) To sharpen competitive power and to
qualify itself to be the second largest bank, the BCG launched a
similar project and, by 1982, had installed its own ATMs at some
major sub-branches of the Bank of China and the Nanyang Commercial
Bank. However, the extent of the network was not comparable to t a c
of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank. Knowing that ATM machines are a
key tool for attracting depositors, the BCG worked hard to establish
the most extensive network in-Hong Kong through a joint-A71 service
with a number of local and foreign banks. Just at the time of the
announcement of the JETCO (Joint Electronic Tellers Card
Organization) system in summer 1983, the Hong Kong and Shanghai bank
joined its ATM service with its subsidiary Hang Seng Bank and
started the joint service on September 1, 1983. This was six nx)nths
ahead of the full operation of the JETCO system and successfully
maintained the Hong Kong Bank's leadership in machine utilization
rate. However, the BCG will not stop with JETCO. It plans to
implement a POS '(Point of Sale) system in supermarkets where
customers can pay for their goods by crediting their accounts at the
BCG. This will put the BCG into a leading position in electronic
consumer banking services.•
The ATM war marked a new stage of consolidation in the Hong
42
Kong banking industry. It is not going to cease for the next
decade. Not only are the banks competing for better service in the
retail banking sector, but they are aggressively looking for
qualified borrowers in the commercial and international market
sectors. The Bank of. China Group, in its market re-positioning
struggles, is trying hard to attract borrowers in the commercial




COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL LOANS
STRATEGIES AND POLICIES
Like most commercial banks, the BCG's main sources of income
come from commercial and industrial loans. As one senior official
of the Sin Hua Trust, Savings and Commercial Bank put it,
Commercial and industrial loans constitute a key source of our
income and will remain to be so in the near future. Revenue
sources for the banks of the BCG are not published. However, the
writers postulate that, with the exception of The Bank of China,
most of the sister banks-.build their profits on credits and loans to
the commercial and industrial sectors or in the related businesses.
Recent Performance of the BCG
For the BCG, the amounts of loans have been increasing over the
past few years. In 1983 alone, the total amount of domestic
industrial loans extended by the BCG exceeded one billion dollars,
representing an average amount of $300,000 to each of the 3240
successful applicants. (see Table 11)
44TABLE 11
THE BCG INDUSTRIAL LOAN STATISTICS
Change overJan-Dec Change over 1982 Jan
1983 BCG Banking average month1984
only Industry of 1983
$1,000m +18 +10.2 $200m +100Industrial
Loans
No. of Successful 3,240 T.A. N.A. 780 +140
Loan Applications
$308,000 N.A. N.A. $256,000 -30Average Loan
per Applicatior
Source: Wei Wen Pao, March 13, 1984.
N. A.- Data Not Available
The percentage increase in the value of industrial loans was 18
percent over the previous year versus a general increase of 10.2
percent for the whole banking industry. This suggests that the
business growth rate of the BCG is significantly higher than the
industry growth rate. In other words, the BCG is gaining in market
share of the industrial loan market. In 1984, the Hong Kong economy
is rapidly recovering from the recession. The manufacturing
industries, in particular the garment industry, are loaded with
export orders from the U.S. market. Commercial and industrial
loans are expected to be under increasing demand. In the month of
January 1984, the BCG approved 780 applications for industrial loans
with a total loan amount of two hundred million dollars. Compa red
with the average figures of 1983, this represented a 140 percent
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increase in successful applications and 100 percent increase in loan
amounts. The tremendous increase is tied up with external economic
factors as described, but is also a consequence of the aggressive
strategy of the BCG in recent years.
Under the general business strategy of enlarging the loan
portfolio in the manufacturing industry to enhance the stability and
prosperity of the economy, each sister bank adopts its ourn inarketin
strategy. Most of them set up their own industrial loan groups to
facilitate loan application processing. Moreover, branches and
sub-branches of the BCG located in the industrial districts send
out their marketing people to establish bank-customer relationships.
This very act shows that the BCG is now paying special attention to
the industrial loan business.
Basically, different types of commercial and industrial loans
offered by the BCG fall under three main categories viz. industry
and trade financings small industrial loans and credits, long-term
loans. The first two categories will be further discussed.
Industry and Trade Financing
This is the traditional business and a primary function of ttic
bank. In recent years, operations in this area have been enlarged.
The BCG now offers mortgage loans on self-purchased plants,
machinery and equipment. Trade financing includes letter of credit
(LC) loans, discounting, back-to-back LC, packing loans, trust
receipts (TR), term loans, overdrafts etc. The general policy in
extending such credits and loans is to offer better interest rates
and longer maturities. The degree of flexibility depends on the
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size, performance and the needs of the customers' business.
For mortgages on self-owned new plants, the BCG offers loans
with maturities of up to ten years, and occasionally up to fifteen
years. The most favorable interest rate offered to the "best"
customers may be even 0.5 percent below the best lending rate. For
mortgages on used plants (three to ten years old), the maximum
maturity can be up to ten years while the interest rates can still
be one-half to one percent below the market rate. Mortgage loans on
machinery usually have three to five years of maturity depending on
the type of machine, product life cycle and the rate of
depreciation. Interest rates are comparable to loans on plants.
From such loan policies, it is obvious that the BCC is offering
more attractive terms to manufacturers relative to its competitors.
Its aggressive strategy is a matter not only of popmotion but also
of a marketing strategy to gain in market share through more
attractive products. A comparison of the terms offered by some of
the BCG banks and their competitors on property mortgage loans is
detailed in Appendix IX.
The Small Industrial Loans and Credit Scheme
When the real estate and property market was booming in the
late 70's and early 80's, so much money and credit were diverted to
the estate business that the whole economy was disrupted. Few
investors were interested in opening up factories and even the
factory-owners themselves sold off their plants for capital gains.
This phenomenon put a heavy pressure on the stability and prosperity
of Hong Kong, for the estate business could not boom forever and the
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collapse of the manufacturing industry would be a disaster to its
900,000 workers and hence the whole population. This was the
background against which the commercial banks put up their small
industrial loans plans after the Government refused to do anything
in support of the manufacturing industry. The plan was announced by
the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank and the Chartered Bank in February
1983 and was followed by the BCG three weeks later. This small
industrial loans and credit plan is aimed at helping small
manufacturers get through their difficulties. The application
procedure is intended to be simple, and loan advances can be granted
in about two weeks.
Starting February 28, 1983, the BCG accepted applications
through five of the sister branches, viz.
The Bank of China
Nanyang Commercial Bank
The Bank of Communications
Sin Hua Trust, Savings and Commercial Bank
Yien Yieh Commercial Bank Ltd.
Under this scheme, the facilities provided include term loan and
postdate check discounting. The target customers of this scheme are
manufacturers who own their own plants and who have less than fifty




A definition of a small industrial loan under this scheme is a
loan under HK$200,000. Since the objective of this loan is only to
help manufacturers solve temporary liquidity problems, the
maturities of such a loan are limited to six to twelve months.
Though the terms offered are similar to those under the scheme
offered by the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (HKSBC), it is the policy
of the BCG to offer better interest rates to the customers. The
facts will clarify this deliberate policy:
Small industrial term loan interest rates
Monthly rate (flat) Annualized rate
B CG 0.85% 18%
22HKS B C 1.00%
The monthly rates are based on a fixed principal rather than or
a reduced balance principal- The annualized rates, using the normal
reduced balance convention, show that the BCC is four percent more
generous in interest rate than the Hong Kong Bank.
This loan is of fered by the BCG at no extra charges to the
borrowers. Early repayment will be accepted with an extra one moth
interest charge on the principal outstanding. An illustration of
the lending and repayment method is as follows:
Loan Principal: $100,000
Interest: 0.85% p.m. flat
Terms: Monthly repayment starting the next
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month for a consecutive 12 months
Calculation
Monthly repayment on principal= $100,000/12
=$ 8, 333.3
Monthly interest payment= $100,000 x 0.85%
=$ 850
Total Principal and interest p.m.=$ 9,183.3
Total Repayment in 12 months= $110,199.6
Although the BCG seems to be more aggressive than the Hong Kong
Bank in extending small industrial loans by offering more
competitive interest rates, the requirements on the part of the
borrower are very similar. Bank account statements with the
applicant's existing bankers must be submitted to the BCG for
reference. Audited financial statements should be presented for
analysis of the company's financial strengths. Moreover, the BCG
may send officers to visit the applicants' factory to determine its
operations and management performance. After all, outstanding
orders on hand are very important to the approval of a loan. (More
about the credit evaluation criteria will be mentioned in the next
section.) A copy of the small industrial loan application form of
the BCG is included in Appendix X.
Check Discounting,
This is another facility under the scheme that is aimed at
financing working capital. Again, discounting, under this small
industrial loan scheme, is limited to $260,000. The discounting
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period is limited to 1-month, 2-months or 3-months. Each check
presented for discounting is treated as a discrete discounting unit
and is processed separately.
Again it is the policy of the BCG to offer clients discounting
rates lower than those of the Hong Kong Bank. During the time of
this research study, the discounting rate offered by the BCG was 1.4
percent while that offered by the Hong Kong Bank was 1.75 percent.
On an annual basis, the interest differential would be 4.2 percent,
which is quite significant. As an illustration, a client presenting
a check for $10,000 payable in 3 months to the BCG for discounting
will get an advance payment of $9,580 with $420 deducted as interest
for 3 months (1.4% x 3 x $10,000). The minimum charge on interest
is $100 for the discounting service.
The granting of the check discounting facility to an applicant
is based on the criteria, set out by the Hong Kong and Macau Regional
Office. Generally, the drawee (the one who signs the check) is of
importance in considering the approval. If the checks of a
particular drawer concentrate on only one or two drawees, the
application for discounting is unlikely to succeed. For drawings of
over $50,000, it may be necessary on some occasions for some BCG
personnel to visit the drawee to ensure the validity of the
transactions. The BCG is also very concerned about the proper use
of the discounting facility. it requires that every check presented
for discounting be accompanied by the corresponding invoice. This
policy is enforced to ensure that the checks are issued in normal
business transactions and that they are not drawn on trading
partners for the purpose of obtaining short-term funds from the
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bank.
Concerning early redemption, the BCG will accept this measure
only if deemed necessary. The full amount must be settled in cash
before the discounted check can be returned. The discount interest
paid will not be returned in any case. Another policy regarding
discounting is that a discounted check cannot be replaced by a new
postdated check. The new check must be discounted for cash to
recover the check discounted in the first instance. In this way,
the BCG gains extra interest from the new discounting.
It is a general principle that the small industrial loans are
to be guaranteed. The guarantor can be the applicant's trading
partners or a third party. However, since the lending limit undex
this scheme is $200,000, which is small compared to a bank's
portfolio, quite a degree of flexibility in the principle can be
allowed. If the factory run by the applicant is well-managed and
customer orders outstanding are reliable, the requirement for
guarantee can be waived. For check discounting, the waiver may be
obtained if the check is drawn on a reputable body. Despite such
flexibility in principle, the policy is to handle each application
in a strict way.
Viabilty of the Scheme
The launching of the small industrial loan scheme in February
1983, caused considerable impact in the banking industry. Many
manufacturers enquired for details of the scheme. The Hong Kong-
Bank and the BCG were busy dealing with their potential customers.
However, the interest of the enquirers could not be maintained lord
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enough to make the scheme widely beneficial. A primary reason could
have been the lack of variety in the facilities packaged under the
scheme. Though term loans and check discounting are frequently
demanded by manufacturers, they do not suffice the needs of the
customers. Many small manufacturers want a credit line in which
term loans, overdrafts, discounting, letters of credit and packing
loans can be used in combination so as to allow them flexibility in
financing their working capital. A scheme of term loans and check
discounting was not sufficient to attract their interest. The
application of those who are in desperate need of the small
industrial loans may not be accepted because it is really difficult
for them to find guarantors for the loans. Even if they can, the
banks may not recognize the trustworthiness of the guarantors. On
such grounds, the scheme does not seem to fulfill its designated
purposes.
In the next section, the difficulties facing small business
owners trying to obtain funds from the BCG or, in fact, from any
bank, will be disussed. How some BCG lending officers handle loan
applications will be revealed, using a real case experience.
Business Loan Application Experience with the BCG
---A Real Business Case
During the course of this study, one of the writers got a
chance to apply for bank loans' for a small expanding garment trading
company. Though the company had already been conducting its
transactions with the Hong Kong Bank, the writer strongly suggested
that it try to obtain financial support from the BCG due to its
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aggressive outlook. After discussions with the other directors of
the company, the writer decided to approach the Bank of China
because of its leadership position among the sister banks.
The Borrower's Position
Before actual contact with the Bank was made, the writer spent
quite a considerable amount of time investigating the operations of
the company, the garment industry, the merchandise of the company,
the quality and styles of the products, the customers, brandnames of
the products, the suppliers, manufacturers, export markets and
internal management strengths and weaknesses. Most important of
all, an analysis was done on the financial position of the company.
The proforma ncan statement and cash flow statement were prepared
for the coming half year ending June 1984, based on projections from
past data and confirmed customer orders on hand. Copies of the
proforma statements, past bank statements and confirmed letters of
credit on hand were made ready for the Bank's reference.
The company was incorporated under limited liability in
November 1983, but had been conducting business for months before
its incorporation. Its merchandise is mainly high quality woolen
sweaters for many of the top ten brandnames in the U.S. and European
markets. It is managed by an aggressive, well-educated young lady,
who had ten years of experience in design and marketing of woolen
sweaters.
The problem facing this trading firm was the lack of short-term
finance on its working capital to meet large incoming customer
orders. Due to the company's good reputation and its overseas
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relationships, which the entrepreneur had established in her career,
many orders kept coming in. By January 1984, the company had
received confirmed sales orders amounting to over three million
dollars and had to turn down a few orders for financial reasons.
The company had a few small-to-medium size manufacturers working for
it, but those manufacturers were just doing the labour on a fixed
price contract basis with materials supplied by the company (This is
called C.M.T. work). In this way, the company had considerable
assurance over labour costs and perhaps could yield a greater gross
margin. However, it had to spend millions of dollars to import wool
and other raw materials. Since the company was new and did not have
any reliable source of finance, it had to rely on cash payments or
unfavourable supplier credit terms. Sometimes, orders could not be
accepted due to the inability to pay for the required raw materials
before payment could be reserved from the customers.
The managing director of the company worked closely with the
writer to look into possible means of finance. The mission for the
writer was to negotiate with the banks for extending short-term
loans to the company. The forms could be trust receipts (TR),
letter of credit issues (LC), and packing or term loans. However,
the most ideal form is a package with different conbinations of the
above mentioned forms with the addition of an overdraft facility.
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Experience with the Bank of China
An application letter for loans and the related financial
documents was prepared before the bank was contacted. The writer
then telephoned the credit department of the main branch of the Bank
of China. Some preliminary information as to the nature and scope
of the business, markets and legal identity of the company was
required by the officer over the phone. Upon learning that the
company was newly incorporated, the officer said that credit
facilities could not be extended normally. However, at the writer's
request, an interview was scheduled a few days later.
The person with whom the discussion was held was a deputy
manager in the Funds Management and Credit Department. A
well-educated young man with a friendly appearance, the deputy
manager met the writer in a reception area near the open office in
which he worked. The meeting was started off by shaking hands and
exchanging of business cards.
When the writer voiced his desire for every possible form of
loans, the deputy manager started to explain the lending policy of
the Bank of China. It is not possible that each application for
loans be approved. The Bank needs to protect itself from bad loans.
Normally, we have to look at a number of things before we can
consider granting a loan. Financial documents, including an audited
balance sheet, income statement, and bank statements over the last
year as well as company tax return information, are the first
requirements. Articles and memorandum of association, customer
profile, orders on hand, assets for mortgage and guarantors are also
to be presented to the Bank.
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When asked about the requirements on the part of a new trading
firm with little fixed assets and virtually no operating history,
the deputy manager commented, It is really difficult to grant
credit lines to a trading company for which the Bank can trace no
past records. However, the Bank can consider giving mortgage loans.
Your request for an overdraft is almost impossible. Our Bank
extends the overdraft facility only to large, reputable customers
but even then the overdraft amount may not be as large as the
$500,000 that you have requested. Disappointed, yet not surprised
by the bankers' response, the writer asked what the Bank would be
able to do-for such a potential customer.
The deputy manager explained, We can consider granting any
sort of loans and credit to companies having proven records of
performance. These forms include TR, LC, back to back LC,
discounting bills etc. However, new establishments must first build
up relationships with our Bank for a considerable period before we
will consider their credit line applications. I urge your company
to open up a checking account in our Bank and to conduct business
transactions with us for some time. After knowing more about each
other, we can discuss the credit terms again. Otherwise, if you can
provide us with securities or fixed assets for guarantee purposes,
we may also discuss about your requests next time. That was the
end of the discussion. (For minutes of the meeting, see Appendix
XI.)
During the course of discussion, the writer showed the banker
the balance sheet, income statement, profprma cash flow and income
statements, bank account statements and copies of the on hand
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letters of credit for his inspection. He seemed to be interested it
the LCs, nevertheless, he was not able to extend loans on that basis
alone.
A valuable lesson learnt from this experience is that overdraft
credit is not a desired form of credit at the Bank of China. A rate
of 4.5 percent over the prime rate is charged on overdraft, versus
0.5 percent for bills credits. A higher rate is imposed on the
client because he pays interest for relatively short periods on the
overdraft loan versus other forms of loans. Another important
element of the Bank of China's lending policy to small enterprises
is its unwillingness to extend a loan package including combinations
of, say, term loans, LC service amount, and TR limit beyond the
customers' deposits with the Bank:. As a matter of fact, the
fore-mentioned trading company was able to obtain a loan of $200,000
and a LC limit of $500,000 totalling $700,000, which exceeded its
$500,000 deposit with the Hong Kong Bank.
Subject very much to the customers' previous relations with the
Bank, the Bank of China is more conservative towards its small
business clients than the other sister banks of the BCG or the Hong
Kong Bank. More will be discussed in the next section.
Experience with the Bank of Communications
The trading company for which the writer worked did not call
the Bank of China again for a loan application due to its inability
to produce the securities for a loan. Instead, the writer decided
to contact the Bank of Communications to see if it could offer more
attractive terms.
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About two weeks later, the writer phoned the Loans Department
of the Bank of Communications with a similar request. The officer,
whom the writer found out later to be the manager of the Loans
Department, showed a more positive attitude and emphasized that his
Bank could offer loans to trading companies with no plant and
machinery. Though this was nothing new, it showed that the bank was
interested in getting the business. The writer requested for an
appointment on the next day.
The writer went with another consultant of the company to the
bank's main office to meet the manager, who was a tactful person
with a different character than the deputy manager of the Bank of
China the writer met in the Bank of China. The style and behaviour
of the manger infirmed that he was an experienced banker full of
business sense. He repeatedly said that his Banff, could offer
attractive credit terms on condition that transactions be maintained
with the Bank for a period of time. He did not go into details of
the different facilities but stressed that his Bank would be
flexible enough to extend a credit line limit in excess of the
deposits maintained in the account. He fetched the application
documents for opening checking accounts with the Bank and handed
them to the writer. The financial analysis data the writer showed
him were all kept by the Bank. He promised that the submitted
documents would be forwarded to the Bills Department on receiving
the company's current account application.
The meeting itself did not result in anything helpful to the
company's situation. However, the manager presented the image that
the Bank of Communications was more flexible and eager in small
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business trade financing than the Bank of China. Furthermore, its
terms might be sof ter. This is in line with the writers' earlier
postulation that the Bank of China is more interested in corporate
and international financing, while the Bank of Communications is
active in trade financing. The minutes of the meeting with the Bank






receiving Bank Position Remark
phone call
23-1-84 China & South Credit Information required for




2 3-1- 84 Bank of Credit Information required:
Communications Officer accounts and financial
tatements for the past
two years.
2 3-1-84 China State Credit Information required:
Bank Officer account statements,
company memorandum.
24-1-84 Nanyang Credit The prerequisite for
Commercial Officer loan application is
Bank that there should have
a current account with
the bank for some time.
25-1-84 CreditBank of China Information required:
Officer Orders on hand,
last year report on
bank account.
25-1-84 Nanyang Credit Wish to come to the company
Commercial Officer to have a look.
Bank
27-1-84 China State Credi t Wish to talk to the manager.
Bank Officer
31-1-84 CreditBank of China Eager to meet the manager,
Officer loan application will be
dropped after 2 weeks.
It was mentioned in the chapter on methodologythat the writers
wished to find out the difference in the aggressiveness of the
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lending policy among sister banks by comparing how quickly, how
often and through which level of employee did sister banks respond
to the loan application letter. Since these five banks made their
first enquiry call within three days, and all the personnel
disclosed only that they are credit officer instead of saying what
grade they hold, the writers, therefore, made the following
conclusion based only on the number of times these five banks
responded.
Only five out of the sister banks responded to the writers'
loan application. Although China South Sea Bank and the Bank of
Communications were among the first in making an inquiry phone call,
these two banks only called once. Not only did the China State,
Nanyang Commercial Bank and the Bank of China call twice, but also
these three banks expressed their eagerness in finding out more
about the company in their second calls. It was true that the
eagerness expressed might be due to the work attitude of individual
personnel, but, the writers believed that their different level of
eagerness could, at least, give the readers some ideas about the
aggressiveness of the bank lending policies. And it seems that China
South Sea Bank, Bank of Communications, China State Bank, Nanyang
Commercial Bank and Bank of China are more aggressive in seeking new
customers. And among these five banks, China State Bank, Nanyang
Commercial Bank and the Bank of China are the most aggressive. But,
from the data in table 7 which shows the Loan to Deposit ratio of
sister banks, the writers discovered that the Bank of China and
f
Nanyang Commercial Bank were among the sister banks that held the
most conservative lending policy back in 1982. Yien Yieh Commercial
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Bank and China State Bank were the most aggressive. And the Bank of
Communications maintained the loan to deposit ratio at an average
level of all the sister banks.
In the telephone interview with a senior officer of the Hong
Kong Macau regional office, he said that the BCG had certain
degree of Division of Labour. That's to say certain sister banks
majored in certain kind of business so as to avoid head-on
competition among the sister banks. The writers tend to think that
these five banks that responded to our inquiry letter might,
perhaps, have engaged in the business of lending to import-export
firm. The do not have any evidence about this viewpoint. More have
to be found out about BCG's Division of labour.
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CHAPTER VII
SUPPORTIVE ACTIVITIES FOR THE NEW BUSINESS STRATEGY
By now, it is obvious that, starting from 1978, the BCG has
grown at a tremendously fast pace. To make this research a complete
one, the writers want to discuss some aspects of the BCG's internal
developments aimed at supporting the rapid expansion of its
business.
Computerisation
Before the end of 1976, each of the sister banks operated as an
independent entity. Not only there was no operating relationship
among sister banks, a customer had to go to the same branch of a
particular sister bank in which he had opened an account to deposit
or to withdraw cash from the account.
Drastic change occurred in 1978: the BOC took the lead to
modernise its operation by buying two IBM 3032 systems. In October
1979, the operation of the BOC saving accounts was computerised.
Following the computerisation of saving accounts of all the sister
banks in June 1980, the BCG became a genuine bank group, which holds
the second largest retail banking network in Hong Kong. This is. to
say that a customer having a savings account in any sister bank can
deposit or withdraw money from any branch of any sister bank. The
number of savings accounts was said to irtcrease to 14,000. While the
amount of savings deposit increased to HK$810 million. From then
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on, time deposit and current accounts were progressively
computerized. And in the first quarter of 1984, the BCG installed a
series of automatic teller machines to provide service to its
customers.
Training
On 1st March, 1984, the writers visited a training and
development center, located in Hong Kong Island's Western District
(Mount Davis Road, 64). As was mentioned in Chapter four, the cente'
is under the supervision of the training and development department
of the Hong Kong and Macau Regional Office. The center provides
training courses to the staff of all the sister banks. Besides this
center, there is another one, which occupies one whole floor in the
Kwangtung Provincial Bank building in Jordan. The center is a
six-story building, which has a total area of 2,000 square meters.
Through films and explanations made by a senior executive of the
center who is a deputy manager in charge of the center, the writers
found that the center was set up in 1982 and was well-prepared to
receive visitors from outside world (For the framework of questions
that was set for the interview with the officer, see Appendix XIV).
The center is comprised of two large lecture halls, which can
acommodate more than 60 people each, three medium-size lecture
rooms, which can hold more than 40 people each and several seminar
and conference rooms. All these halls and rooms are equipped with
latest furniture and sophisticated teaching tools, e. g. overhead
projectors, video system for role-play studies and 26 computer
terminals, which cost US$ 10.000 each. These facilities. toether
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with carpet, soft lighting and internal decoration showed the
writers the great attention that the BCG has devoted to training.
The top two stories of the building are used as a hostel for those
who come from mainland China to receive one to two years training on
international banking business. The hostel is comprised of 20 rooms.
To make the whole center complete., there is a canteen that can
provide meals for 200 people. The writers were told that simply the
internal set up and equipment cost HK$ 3 million.
Courses that are provided by the training center can be divided
basically into two types: one is to provide fundamental training to
those new comers who join the sister banks as low-level personnel
(clerk or teller), and another type of course targets officers from
middle to upper level management.
Once the to-be-teller or.clerk is recruited by any one of the
sister banks, he/she is required to pass through a training period
of two weeks. Most likely, the new employee will be posted on the
job for a while before receiving training. This is because the
training center is limited to 80 people each class and can schedule
only three to four classes each year. The program includes courses
on the fundamental banking business. Besides that, students are also
trained to count money notes and become fimiliar with the adding
machine and computer terminal. Furthermore, there is one room that
is set up exactly like a bank. Role-playing, either as customer or
teller in this bank, gives the students a sense of what the real
environment will be. Realising the importance of customer service, a
lecturer also teaches students how to handle customer. Also a video
system is employed to facilitate the studies. Students complete the
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program by taking an examination at the end of the training period.
Individual courses are provided throughout the year for
officers from middle to upper level management. These cover a wide
range of topics, from the traditional banking business, such as the
evaluation of remittances and laws involved in checking accounts to
other related areas, such as business promotion, insurance business
and English studies. Although the center does not provide a
coordinated program for officer grade personnel, it organised a
training program, with the help of the Chinese University of Hong
Kong, in the summer of 1983 for those senior officers. It also
arranged a program on banking with the Hong Kong Polytechnic. This
is a two-year program, in which officers are required to attend two
lectures a week. Each lecture lasts for three hours. And, as t the end
of program, they will be issued a certificate. To reduce the
pressure on those officer grade personnel, they are not not required
to take an examination at the end of each course. Furthermore, the
staff of the sister banks is encouraged to study for professional
examinations, for example, AIB. Eighty percent of the examination
fee will be given back to the staff member if he has been able to
earn the qualification. The writers were told that, in the future,
if a staff member of the sister banks passes the AIB, he/she will be
promoted.
The center is responsible only for finding out the training
needs of the sister banks and in providing appropriate courses to
them. The responsibility of selecting staff to receive training is
left to the individual sister bank.
There are 26 staff and lecturers in the center (The training
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center of Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation has 120 permanent
staff and lecturers). Apart from these permanent staff, senior
officers of sister banks, experienced persons in the insurance
field, lecturers of the University of Hong Kong, the Chinese
University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Polytechnics are invited
occasionally to give lectures.
In 1983, the center trained nearly 500 persons. The result of
this training is better manifested in the lower level management
staff. They are said to be able to take up work more easily and
readily after training. A longer time is needed for the middle to
higher level management to demonstrate what they have learned in the
courses.
In view of the great demand for training of the sister banks'
personnel, the fifth floor of the center will be expanded to add two
more teaching rooms. The training and development department plans
to open up another center in the building of the Bank of China. To
fulfil the need of personnel training from branches of the sister
banks in the New Territories, another center will be established in
Tsuen Wan. It is hoped that, at the end of this year, managers of
all sister banks' branches can receive training.
Personnel
The writers were told by a senior officer of the BOC's
personnel department that there are about 750 staff (Framework of
questions that was set for the interview, see Appendix XIII). About
200 of them are of officer grade. Roughly speaking, one officer
versus two subordinates. In view of the great demand in various
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departments, the human resource has been expanded by 50 percent
since 1979. The remittance department had only twenty to thirty
staff in 1979 while the department has about fifty to sixty staff
now. Because of the increase in the number of branches, the staff
force in the deposit department has also experienced a great
expansion. The loan department has not expanded its staff very
much, but the employees in this department are carefully selected to
ensure their high working capability. The writers speculate that the
reason for most of the staff in the Bank of China being very young
(from 25 to 40 years old) is because of the recent rapid expansion
of its staff force. But those who hold senior management positions
are above 50 years old: furthermore, most of them come from the PRC.
Before a-979, most of the staff were recruited from leftist colleges.
Needless to say, they are of secondary school qualification.
Although relationships are still maintained with these schools,
recruitment now is open. The Bank of China recruits not only low
level personnel, but also employs middle management from outside.
This is something that the BOC seldom did in the past. The
recruitment process has been improved. Before staff are recruited,
they will be interviewed by a person specially responsible for this
job. And in recent years, the educational level of staff has been
raised to University level.
The ratio of men to women in the BOC overall is about one to
one. It seems that there is no discrimination between men and women
in the recruitment process. But the men to women ratio in senior
management level is about three to one, and there are more women
than men in the lower levels.
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The past appraisal system will continually be used. That is,
the performance of a staff will be evaluated by several supervisors.
The result is not disclosed to the staff, but it is manifested in
the in the amount of bonus and salary increment that the staff
receives at the end of the year. The promotion will basically be
based on the seniority,, but performance is now receiving heavier
weight in the appraisal than before.
The salary scale is devised principally by the personnel
department of the Hong Kong and Macau Regional Office. Thus, most
sister banks have a similar salary scale. Concerning the adoption of
the salary scale set forth by the Hong Kong and Macau Office, the
writers sensed during the interview that the BOC does not have much
bargaining power. The writers speculate that the BOC and r,-Post
sister banks must, to a very large extent, follow the decision made.
BCG adopts the same scale of officer grade throughout. This scale is







The list shows the hierarchy structure. General Manager is the
top man, while Supervisor is the lowest in the management level. The
officer with same grade will hold the same authority no n'itter
whether he is posted in the headquarters or in one of the hr:inches.
The personnel department of the BOC also encourages the
organisation of activities by a welfare group, which is nude up of
the staff of various departments.The representatives of the welfare
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group come from different departments. During festivals, for
example, New Year, the PRC national day, the welfare group will be
busy in organising activities, which are sponsored by the personnel
department of the BOC.
Since the BOC holds the lead position in the BCG, the writers
think that other sister banks also work with similar personnel
policy. And each sister bank may modify the policy to suit its own
management style and particular needs.
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CHAPTER VIII
EVALUATION OF STRATEGIES AND CONCLUDING COMMENTS
Summa ry
For years, the Bank of China Group remained a dormant giaint
behind the rapid growth of the Hong Kong economy. Stimulated by
China's recent philosophy of driving for economic goals, the giant
awoke and stretched his hands and knees to prepare himself to r the
long march. But then, how to recover from his wounds (caused by
the Cultural Revolution) and how to catch up with the others ahead
of him were his first codcerns. Even his father, the govvertu:cnt of
China, could not help other than to clear the way.
This analogy summarises the relation between the BCC: and the
Chinese authority, at the risk of oversimplification. The BCC: did
catch up. In five years time, the leader of the BCG, the Bank of
China, has become the most profitable bank in Hong Kong, the 13th
largest bank in Asia and the 33rd largest in the world in terms of
assets. The performance was not accidental but related to the
adoption of aggressive business strategies after 1978.
A summary of what the BCG has done is that it has become ti-tore
involved on both sides of the balance sheet. Indeed, batiks today
are very concerned about asset and liability management, tntiovtivc
banking products and electronic banking. The new asset mandgemtnt
strategies are to enlarge and diversify the portfolio, to lengt hen
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maturities of loans, and to participate in international funding.
On the other side of the balance sheet, the strategy is to expand
the capital base of each sister bank and to acquire funds by every
possible banking instrument. An aggressive strategy in establishing
the largest ATM network and POS (Point of Sale) crediting in Hong
Kong moves the BCG to a leading position in electronic banking. In
trade and industrial financing, the BCG adopts aggressive policies
to lend at longer maturities and lower interest rates to help the
economy prosper. In terms of information systems and personnel
development, the BCG tries to get ahead of other banks by installing
the latest computer systems and emphasizing staff training heavily.
Strengths and Problems
Perhaps one single unique characteristic of the BCG, which
differentiates it from all other commercial banks, is its direct
relatioship with the China State Council. The bust following the
property market boom brought many local financial institutions to
insolvency. The Beijing government, for both political and economic
reasons, is unlikely to let any banks in the BCG become insolvent.
Thus the BCG can be expected to remain a reliable banking
institution with a relative low risk of insolvency. It is said that
the sister banks can utilize not only formal reserves but also the
profits that have been generated in the past. This gives the BCG
special assitance that cannot be had by free enterprise banks.
Thus, there are available not only conventional reserves but also
past recorded earnings that can be retreived from the state to
strengthen the banks' positions. The second source of financial
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comfort for some members of the BCG is their ability to write of f
bad debts on a convenient basis. The Hong Kong registered sister
banks of the BCG are subject to the full rigours of professional and
public audit, and this avenue of write-off is hardly available.
However, the China-incorpo rated sister banks in the BCG can obtain
consent from the Chinese authorities to write off bad loans over a
considerable period of time. Thus, the BCG has a clear advantage
over its competitors in its capacity to absorb bad loans.
The historic role of the BCG banks has been the financing of
Hong Kong importers in China trade and other China-related
organizations. In the coming years, accompanying the rapid
development of the Chinese economy, imports, exports and re-exports
trade with China will certainly boom. The BCG will be in an
advantageous position to compete with other newcomers for the China
trade market. Up till the present, no foreign banks have been
allowed to run a full banking business within China. The BCG,
through its branches and connections in China, is the most qualified
institution to provide banking and consulting services for
investments in China. Even if the legal system governing foreign
banks operating in China is re-written in the future and many
foreign banks are thus allowed full banking operations, the BCG
should still be in the lead.
In the local market, the BCG has the second largest retail
network and the largest ATM system. This is certainly an advantage
to the BCG's retail customer because it means less waiting time in a
less congested environment. Due to the rapid expansion and heavy
fixed asset investment in recent years, many of the facilities are
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of the latest design and technology. The computer system of the 1CC
is one of the most advanced systems with a great capacity to expand
processing. Many existing offices have been renovated, and a dozen
new ones are being erected. The sizeable training and development
plan for employees at different levels helps to assure the latest
customer service standards and attitudes in addition to the physic.-dl
facilities already available. This sort of human resources trainill,
is the most important constituent to the success of an organiza tioln,
especially to a bank where people are the most important asset.
Judging from the heavy emphasis on personnel training in terms of
management attitudes and actual implementation programs s, the
writers believe that the BCG is likely to gain even more success on
the basis of well-trained service personnel, provided that such
training is effectively delivered to the majority of the BCC
employees.
It does not follow that the road in front of the BCG i s wi tlxntt t
obstacles. A very serious threat lies in the fact that the young
population and the professionals of Hong Kong have not been williiV,
or have never thought it necessary to open up accounts with the B(%.'..
This affects not only the liability side of the balance sheet but
also the investment portfolio of the BCG. Many people open up
accounts with the Hong Kong Bank because they have confidence in t he
Bank and its variety and efficiency of service. Businessmen go to
the Hong Kong Bank for loans and credits presumably because they
have maintained connections with the Bank, which count towards
successful application for credit.
Many people, expecially the professionals and business
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executives, take a rather conservative viewpoint towards the BCG.
Some of them are afraid that their accounts in the BCG might be
frozen if anything goes wrong in China. Others hold the view that
the BCG banks are inefficient and do not incorporate all the banking
improvements. The majority of the others may simply prefer the
status quo. They just stick to their present bankers unless those
banks are disappointing. These attitudes focus on the most
fundamental weakness of the BCG: the public's confidence in the BCG
and its image has not been up to the level that a bank of its size
and strengths deserves.
Despite its aggressive strategies, the business growth of the
BCG is hindered by its conservatism in certain aspects. When the
issue on the future of Hong Kong was brought into public attention
in 1982, many long term investments were held back, and banks were
unwilling to extend loans with maturities beyond 1997. Although it
was apparent that the Bank of China, which reports to the State
Council, should have done something substantial to maintain the
public's confidence over the future, the lead was instead taken by
the Hong Kong Bank, which announced that it would offer 20-year
loans maturing after 1997. If the BCG had taken the initiative, it
might have won quite substantial public confidence and business as
well.
As regards loan deposit ratios, the Bank of China and the
Nanyang Commercial Bank had values of 72 and 71 percent in 1982.
The other banks in the BCG had ratios exceeding 80 or 90 percent.
Such ratios, compared with. those of most local banks and the Hong
Kong Bank, were relatively high, implying the aggressive lending
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strategies of most deposits to maintain the 75 percent limit set by
the Hong Kong Government. Thus, fund absorption capability for most
BCG banks needs immediate improvement.
Internally, the BCG is facing a personnel development problem.
As has been mentioned, the BCG is launching a series of training
programmes for its personnel. However, a number of the middle
management positions are now occupied by people whose career
advancement might be limited by their qualifications and exposure.
Whether the training programmes can develop their full potential to
equip them for the new challenge is critical to the BCG's future
performance. The top executives of the BCG banks are very
e:perienced bankers with international banking and corporate
management experience, but many of them are beyond their retirement
age. The transfer of authority from the old generation to the
younger one with the continuity of corporate strategies is the most
important task in the coming years. At the lower end of the
organizational hierachy, very young and inexperienced junior
officers constitute almost half of the employee population as a
consequence of the heavy recruitment in the last three or four
years. Their abilities to take up the reponsible positions created
by expansion still need more time to be proved. This may be a
constraint for expansion.
Conclusion, Recommendations and Future Outlook
The adoption of an open door policy and the readjustment,
construction, consolidation and improvement approach to China's
modernization has directed the Bank of China and its subsidiary
77
banks to a new stage of development. Through structural
re-organization, capital injection and more effective assets and
liability management, the Bank of China Group has achieved startling
results over the last few years. The BCG is now the second largest
banking group in Hong Kong and has a target to achieve more, both
locally and internationally. The mission is not easily achievable
in Hong Kong banking, which is highly competitive on a service
basis. To aid further success, the writers suggest that the BCG
should direct its resources toward fostering continual development
of the strenghts it has already established and to remove the
weaknesses in the pursuit of its goals. Within the scope of this
study, the principles include the following:-
1. Invest heavily in strengthening the public's confidence
in the BCG
This can be done through image promotion in advertisement,
social participation and the releasing of more banking
information through the media so that the BCG can be better
known and thus perceived as an integral part of society.
2. Establish more innovative products
One possibility is to offer long term loans with maturities of
over 20 years to capital intensive industries. The financing
of their long term investment projects will be beneficial to
the upgrading of Hong Kong industries in the coming century.
In view of the fluctuating interest rate, the BCG may well
consider extending fixed rate property loans to the lower
income class, which is striving for home ownership. Both
suggestions are within the capabilities of the BCG and would
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greatly help to promote its image as well.
3. Renovate the Small Industrial Loans Scheme
A more inclusive package should be offered to the small
manufacturers to cater to their needs. Restricted to the
services of check discounting and term loans, this scheme
cannot be assured optimal utilization, and hence, the
justification of its existance.
4. Treat people as the most important asset
The success of a bank lies in numerous factors. But a
diligent, capable and helpful work force is critical to
success. For this reason, the BCG should provide training to
all levels of employees, both on specific programmes and on a
long-term career development basil Bi -adening the exposure of
potential management', candidates is as important as motivating
the working spirit of the tellers and clerks. At high level
management, the BCG should accelerate the process of take over
by the younger generation.
5. Re-define the target customers
The population of Hong Kong is made up of a majority of young
people. If the BCG is to seek dominance in the market, it must
place its sights on the young people. Thus, in its promotion
activities, the BCG should stress that it is a bank catering to
the private and business. needs of the young population.
6. Adopt appealing advertising strategies
The advertising plan should not be limited to TV or the post,
but should be extended to other channels that will reach
different market segments. Professional journals or magazines
79
and business publications should also be used to communicate to
the professionals and executives. The focus of the
advertisements should be on fast, convenient and quality
service. Energetic young staff and executives should be the
characters employed in conveying the messages.
The exploration of the South China Sea oil fields is bringing
many business opportunities to l-long Kong. The Hong Kong banking
industry will be more and more involved in the project financing of
the oil-related industries. Other huge projects that will require
sizeable bank participation include the Daya Bay Nuclear Plant, the
Guang-Shen Railway electrification and the renovation of small
factories nationwide. The BCG with its special strenths may well
grasp a major share in these opportunities. The intention and
mission of the Bank of China is made clear by Mr Bu Ming's
statement, The future mission of our overseas branches (Hong Kong
is one of those) is to help in the tasks of the Southwest China
Energy Resources Joint Development Company and Offshore Oil Supplies
Services Company. Subject to the construction needs of China and
the availability of funds, the branches should also actively support
the Hong Kong and Macau businessmen in their China investment
projects.
If the BCG can take the right steps in its expansion programme,
it is likely that its role as a commercial bank will increase in
importance. With China's sovereignty over Hong Kong drawing near,
the status of the BCG is deemed to be raised. It would not be
surprising for the Bank of China to take on a more important role in
the Hong .Kong monetary system. That means its playing a more
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influential role in the determination of interest rates, as well as
the possibility that it will have the authority to issue bank notes,
if the present monetary system is preserved, or will have more
direct control on the money supply, if the system moves towards
central banking. The future will tell.
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APPENDIX I
A LIST OF CHINESE NAMES FOR THE BCG BANKS AND
THE OTHER RELATED ORGAN IZT IONS MENTIONED
Chinese Name English Name
中 國 銀 行 港 澳 辦 事 處
The Hong Kong and Macau Regional Office,
the Bank of China
中 國 銀 行
The Bank of China
交 通 銀 行
The Bank of Communications
中 南 銀 行
The China & South Sea Bank
金 城 銀 行 The Kincheng Banking Corporation
The Kwantung Provincial Bank廣 東 省 銀 行
新 華 銀 行 Sin Hua Trust, Savings and Commercial Bank
鹽 業 銀 行
Yien Yieh Commercial Bank Ltd
浙 江 興 業 銀 行 The National Commercial Bank Ltd
國 華 商 業 銀 行
The China State Bank Ltd
集 友 銀 行 Chiyu Banking Corp. Ltd
華 僑 商 業 銀 行 Hua Chiao Commercial Bank Ltd
南 洋 商 業 銀 行
Nanyang Commercial Bank Ltd
APPENDIX I (Continued)
Chinese Name English Name
Po Sang Bank Ltd
寶 生 銀 行
南 通 銀 行 Nantung Bank (Macau)
大 豐 銀 行
Tai Fung Bank (Macau)
China Development Finance Co. (H. K.) Ltd.中 國 建 設 財 務 （ 香 港 ） 有 限 公 司
中 芝 興 業 財 務 有 限 公 司 CICC Finance Ltd.
Kincheng Tokyo Finance Co. Ltd.金 東 財 務 有 限 公 司
僑 裕 財 務 有 限 公 司 Chiao Yue Finance Co. Ltd.
Chiyu Finance Co. Ltd.集 友 財 務 有 限 公 司
中 貿 證 券 公 司 Chung Mao Securities Ltd.
Trilease International Ltd.
鼎 協 租 賃 國 際 有 限 公 司
中 國 保 險 有 限 公 司 China Insurance Co. Ltd.
The Industrial Bank of Japan
日 本 興 業 銀 行




INTERVIEW GUIDELINES FOR A SENIOR OFFICIAL OF
THE SIN HUA BANK
1. Could you give an introduction on the historical development
of the Bank of China and its sister banks in Hong Kong?
2. Would you give a brief description of the structure of the
BCG organization?
3. Are there any specialization in terms of industry involvement
in each of the BCG banks?
4. What is the relation between China's economic policy and the
business strategies of the Bank of China Group?
5. What degree of authority does the Bank of China have over the
other sister banks, i.e. the degree of autonomy of the sister
banks under the lead of the Bank of China in Beijing?
6. What is your comment about -the strengths and weaknesses of the
BCG in Hong Kong?
7 e What objectives and plans do you have for the future development
of your bank, both short-term and long-term?
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APPENDIX III
INTERVIEW GUIDELINES FOR A LOCAL BANKER
PREVIOUSLY WORKING IN THE BCG
1. What general changes in the BCG in recent years do you observe:
What are the changes in its lending business?
2. How is the loans department in your BCG bank structured'.,
3. How are loans classified in the loans department of the BCG?
Are there any special arrangements for small loans?
What are the major industries in the BCG's portfolio?
4. How do the BCG banks create new customers?
How do they gT intain relations with them?
What is the average application time from the application
to the approval of a small loan?
5. What are the main criteria for approving loans in the BCG?
Does the BCG have some special policy in granting loans to
certain industries? How about in the past (before 1978)?
How do you compare the BCG with other banks in such policies?
6. Are there any specialization in terms of industry in which your
BCG bank is involved?
What is your comment about the BCG bank you worked for?
7. What are the differences between the quality of the personnel
in the loan department of the BCG in terms of qualification
and skills before and after 1978?
8. Can you mention some happy experience when working in the BCG?
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Appendix TV
THE DEPOSITS OF THE BCG EXCLUDING THE BOC
(HKS MILLION)
Bank 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
Communications 2,871 3,092 3,424 4,226 6,339 8,683 11,478
Sin Hua 1,636 1,761 2,126 2,709 3,817 5,011 6,546
Kincheng 1,398 1,504 1,724 2,232 3,330 4,672 5,750
Kwantung 942 1,160 4,427 1,989 2,921 4,328 5,615
National 965 1,032 1,163 1,523 2,326 3,039 3,978
Yien Yieh 801 867 1,041 1,384 2,136 2,752 3,556
South Sea 1,009 1,076 1,249 1,701 2,273 3,403 4,154
China State 868 969 1,119 1,384 2,012 2,809 3,631
Nanyang 893 1,078 1,371 2,415 2,576 3,160 4,021
Po Sang 402 334 525 763 1,127 1,416 1,914
Hua Chiao 263 311 369 455 746 1,292
Chiyu 179 224 302 388 516 703 938
Total 12,227 13,408 15,840 21,169 29,917 40,722 52,873
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Appendix V
HE LOANS OF THE BCG EXCLUDING THE BOC
(HK$ MILLION)
19811980197919 77 197819 7619 75Bank
8, 0486, 7514,9393, 2602,5902, 3202, 1 10Communications
6, 0934, 5432,8231, 9001,4791,3181,186Sin Hua 3, '753
4, 67'?2,6791,6331, 2281,0781,012Ki ncheng
4,5103,4732,3061,274737 876648Kwa ng t ung
3,3712,7751,8741,168770 861727National
3, 3 00233661,6491,025772665633Yien Yieh




761 1,279521277199109 449Hua Chiao
696513348308198150100Chiyu
'.2,420 33, 507 4336969,212 10,813 1425028, 506Total
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Appendix VI





93.0873.96 90.7670.1474.84 69.57Sin Hua
80.3880.3373.16 80.4571.2371.68Ki nch e ng
80.3278.95 80.2461.39 64.0563.53Kwa ng t un g
84.7480.57 91.3174.03 76.6974.61National
92.8077.20 85.9774.0674.1676.70Y i en Yieh
73.33 87.7774.5370.38 73.0270.17South Sea
88.3577.39 86.5873.64 68.9376.57China State
45.34 93.0741.50 62.6236.55Nanyang




68.71 68.26 68.51 74.94 82.28 82.64Ave rage
The figure is above one. That is to say, Hua Chiao and
Nanyang had been very aggressive in their lending
policies. Money lent out is more than the amount of
deposit that was taken in.
88
Appendix VII






26 13611969362313Kwa ngt ung
49 838121 301810National
12810727 56232013Yi en Yieh
49 87 9219 301710South Sea
49 84 8621 301813China State
6627 5610 1187Narryang
41 511664 53Po Sang





BANK OF CHINA PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL
BANK TRANSACTION PUBLICIZED IN 1978-MAY 1981
(IN MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED)
Type of
Amount PurposeDate Participation Form of Credit
100 Property developmentLoanEarly Lender and
in New Territories1978 guarantor
Hong Kong Massn.a.Early n.a. Revolving
Transit System1978 credit
Finance CompanyApril Joint venture Capitaliza Lion $9.7
1979 participant
To Gloxin forSyndicatedJune Co-lender $42-
of five1979 loan
To China CementSyndicatedOct. Co-lead $55.7
loan l1979 Company for expansionmanager
African DevelopmentCo-lende i SyndicatedOct. $150
Bank1979 loan
With Midland BankEurobondDec. Co-lead $30
for Credit Lyonnaise1979 issuemanager
To undisclosed HongLender Single-bankJan. $3.7
1980 Kong property companyloan
For Long-Term CreditEurobondJan. Co-le ad $2S
Bank of Japan1980 manage r issue
Establishment of CICCApril Joint venture Capitalization $2
Finance Limited1980 partner
Establishment ofApril Joint venture Capitalization $1
Ki ncheng Tokyo1980 partner
Co. Ltd.




To Great Wall Hotel,SyndicatedMarcl Co-lender $72
Joint Venture of19 81 loan
Beijing loan by
Nordic Bank
To Finmeccanica,SyndicatedCo-manage rMay $50
S. p. a.1981 loan
To Parkway Properties,S$100SyndicatedCo-managerMay
1981 Limitedloan
n. a.= not applicable




TERMS ON PROPERTY MORTGAGE LOANS
OFFERED BY SELECTED BANKS
AS OF 1983 WITH
BLR*= 13.5%
Max. ChargesInterest Max. AdvanceMaxBank
Amount Valuation HandlingLimit onRateTerm
FeeValua tionP•a•)(years)
.5% onYESDepends onN.T. 70%15%N.T. 13Chase



















NO Same80%(90% for $lm.15%3-Tier system 20
Ta iko os h ing)













70% Same NO Same10 15%Kwantung
Provincial
Bank
10 15 70% Same NO SamePo Sang
Bank
.25% onValued bySame70% or1%10Sin Hua









BLR= Best Lending Rate
The additional 20% is guaranteed by real estate developers.
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APPENDIX X
THE BCG SMALL INDUSTRIAL LOAN APPLICATION FORM
工 業 貸 款 申 請 書
致 　 ： 銀 行 編號：





工 廠 名 稱 （中文） （英文）
廠 址 電 話
辦 公 室 地 址 電話
廠主及主要股東
商 業 登 記 號 碼 設廠日期 工商署工廠登記編號
組 織 類 別 獨資 合夥 有限公司 其他（請註明）





現 有 廠 房 情 況 面 積 平 方 米 自置 估值 萬元 租用 每月租金 萬元
業 務 性 質 業 別 成 品 種 類
僱 員 人 數 工 人 人 其他僱員 人
現有主要生產設備情況（各類機器技術條件、效率、估值）





貸 款 種 類 金 額 萬元 期 限
貸款用途（如屬購置廠房或機器設備，說明總值，自付款項及有關情況）：
保 証 情 況 房 地 產 地址 面積
平方米
估值 萬元 用途 住宅 商業 工業 情況 自 用 出租 空置
其 　 他 說 明




是否 參加香 港工業 團體 是 否 團 體 名 稱
有關工業團體意見：
是否需要工業團體提供意見，由申請人決定




MINUTES OF THE MEETING WITH THE BANK OF CHINA
DISCUSSING A BUSINESS LOAN APPLICATION
Interviewer: Yan Kai-cheung
Director of a trading company limited
Interviewee: Deputy Manager
Funds Management and Credit Department
The Bank of China, Hong Kong.
Date of first contact: Jan 20, 1984.
Date of the meeting: Jan 26, 1984.
Time: 11:10 a.m.
Place of the meeting: The Bank of China, Hong Kong Branch,
Central, Hong Kong.
Discussion
1. The intention of the trading company to obtain a credit line
with a limit up to $500,000 was voiced by the interviewer.
2. The credit policy and the required documents and guarantee
for the credit facilities were explained by the deputy manager
3. Financial documents including the income statement, the proforma
cash flow and income statements and copies of the company's
on hand letters of credit were presented to the manager for
inspect ion.
4. The manager explained his bank's policy is not to extend unsecurec
loans to customers unless they have maintained good relationship
with the bank for a considerable period of time.
5. The interviewer requested for the manager's advice on any possible
steps the company might proceed to obtain loans and credit. The
manager urged the company to open an account in the bank and
to maintain business relations with the bank.
The meeting was terminated at 11:40 a.m.
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APPENDIX XII
MINUTES OF THE MEETING WITH THE BAND OF COMMUNICATIONS
LISCUSSING A BUCINESS LQAN APPLICATIO
Interviewers: Yan Kai-cheung
Director of a trading company limited
A Consultant of the company
Interviewee: Manager, Loans Department,
The Bank of Communions, Hong Kong.
Date of first contact (on phone): Feb 9, 1984.
Time: 2:30p.m.





1. The garment industry was generally discussed.
2. The intention of the company to apply for loans was voiced
by the interviewers.
3. The company was urged to open up an account in the bank and was
further advissed that, after a period of time,the bank could
consider offering unsecured loans and credit to the company.
4. A copy of the current account Qpplication form was fegched by
the manager and given to the interviewers.
The meeting was terminated at 2:50 p.m.
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Appendix XI I I
FRAMEWORK OF QUESTIONS
(INTERVIEW WITH THE OFFICER OF
PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT OF THE BANK OF CHINA)
Expansion of its staff force
Change of the staff's background and educational level
Ratio of staff in upper and lower management
Ratio of men to women staff in the organisation
Age of staff in different management levels
Appraisal system
Determination of the personnel policy
(Independent or has to follow the predetermined
policy set by the organisation of higher authority)
Personnel Policy among sister banks




(INTERVIEW WITH THE OFFICER OF THE TRAINING
DEVELOPMENT CENTER)
The set-up of the center
The extent of the responsibility of the training and
development center
Nature of courses provided
The performance of the training center





Reynolds, Paul D. China's Internal Banking and Financial System
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982
Periodicals
"Banking tuition in Hong Kong is never free." Asian Banking,
October 1983. D.76.
"China's banks in the capitalist gard." Asian Banking
December 1980, p.40
"Deposit irLdequate, Lending Policy too aggressive." Editorial
of Hong Kong Economic Journals, 4 January 1984.
"The new) aggressive, Bank of China." Euromoney, July 19 83.
"The profit of the BCG is higher than that of Hong Kong
Shanghai Banking Corporation." Editorial of Hong Kong
Economic Journals, 3 January 1984.
Intervi ews
A banker from the First National Bank of Chicago, Hong Kong.
Interview, 10 March 1984.
A banker from Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation, Hong
Kong. Interview, 10 February 1984.
A banker from a local bank (Ex-BCG banker). Interview,
16 February 1984.
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A junior officer from Po Sang Bank, Hong Kong. Interview,
17 March 1984.
A managing director from a ga rment trading (fmport-export) firm,
Hong Kong. Intervi ew, 10 February 1984.
A senior officer. Sin Hua Trust, Savi ngs & Commercial Bank, Hong
Kong. Interview, 22 November 1983.
A senior officer. The training & development center of the BCG,
Hong Kong. Interview, I March 1984.
A senior officer. The Bank of China, Hong Kong. Interview,
1 March 1984.
Ling, Nancy Au. The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong.
Interview, 23 November 1983.
Wong, Thomas C H. The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong
Kong. Interview, 24 November 1983.
Visit (Information collection)
The information department of Wen Wei Daily. 16 February 1984.
The Trade & Credit Information Service Department of the
Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation. 10 February 1984.
中 銀 集 團 的 業 務 來 略
甄 啟 璋 鄭 道 項
中 國 銀 行 集 團 在 香 港 經 營 已 多 年 ， 一 向 以 作 風 穩 健 保 守 見 稱 ， 業 務 對 象
多 集 中 於 中 國 商 品 貿 易 商 人 、 中 國 駐 港 機 構 及 其 附 屬 組 織 與 人 員 ， 而 在 一 般
零 售 銀 行 業 及 工 商 業 信 貸 方 面 的 參 予 未 見 積 極 。
一 九 七 八 年 底 是 中 國 經 濟 發 展 的 轉 捩 點 ， 對 外 開 放 的 經 濟 政 策 以 及 企 業
體 制 的 改 革 替 中 國 企 業 注 入 新 的 動 力 。 中 銀 集 團 透 過 在 港 澳 的 十 四 間 姊 妹 銀
行 ， 在 短 短 數 年 間 吸 取 了 巨 額 的 存 款 ， 並 在 放 款 業 務 上 取 得 長 促 的 進 展 ， 一
躍 成 為 香 港 的 第 二 大 銀 行 集 團 ， 肩 負 著 繁 榮 中 港 經 濟 的 責 任 。
這 研 究 報 告 立 論 於 進 取 的 業 務 策 略 為 中 銀 集 團 業 績 的 根 源 ， 在 總 體 規 劃
下 ， 銀 行 業 務 的 各 個 環 節 都 必 須 體 現 著 相 應 的 策 略 與 方 針 ， 才 可 使 業 務 恆 久
地 發 展 。 例 如 從 新 經 營 方 式 得 來 的 存 款 、 必 須 也 有 相 配 合 的 放 款 市 場 ； 更 佳
的 服 務 質 素 也 必 須 有 優 良 的 員 工 培 訓 作 支 持 。 因 此 ， 研 究 工 作 圍 繞 著 中 銀 集
團 的 放 款 與 吸 納 存 款 策 略 ， 重 點 了 解 其 對 中 小 型 工 商 業 貸 款 的 條 件 與 審 核 準
則 ， 更 探 討 其 他 諸 如 資 訊 、 培 訓 等 各 方 面 的 配 合 政 策 ， 最 後 提 出 我 們 的 意 見
及 對 未 來 的 展 望 。
研 究 過 程 中 得 到 中 銀 集 團 人 員 的 鼎 力 支 持 與 協 助 ， 十 分 感 激 。 文 櫃 報 資
料 部 、 各 方 良 師 、 學 長 提 供 了 不 少 寶 貴 資 料 及 意 見 ， 使 這 研 究 能 順 利 完 成 ，
在 此 謹 致 謝 意 。


